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Introduction  
Justice Ginsburg’s recent public comments decrying the current court 
as the most activist in history defined judicial activism as “readiness to 
overturn legislation.”1 As an example of this type of activism, she explicitly 
referenced the Court’s decision to overturn a key portion of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 in Shelby County v. Holder.2  And as her dissent in that case 
revealed, she believes the majority opinion failed to give Congress the 
deference due a co-equal branch of government.3   
 
Interestingly, though, the majority and dissent talk past one another 
in their analyses of the central issue in the case: whether the record amassed 
by Congress justified the coverage formula used to determine which 
jurisdictions would be subject to the VRA’s requirement that any changes to 
voting procedures be “pre-cleared” with the Justice Department.  While 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent details the voluminous and compelling accounts of 
racial discrimination in voting procedures in districts covered by the 
preclearance requirement, the majority, as she rightly points out, fails to 
engage the legislative record.4  Rather, the Court’s opinion dismissed the 
utility of the legislative record on the grounds that it was not used to create 
the coverage formula, but rather to justify it after the fact.5   
 
The Shelby County decision is the latest iteration of a dangerous trend 
in judicial review of legislation.  The Court has increasingly required 
Congress to meet procedural standards akin to those required of 
administrative agencies promulgating rules, in particular by measuring 
legislation against the record Congress created.6  Shelby County takes this 
trend one step further by discounting the record before Congress because it 
was created as a justification after the coverage formula had been chosen, 
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
1 Adam Liptak, Court Is ‘One of Most Activist’ Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24 
2013, at A1. 
2 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).  
3 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013) (Ginsburg J., dissenting). 
4 Id. at 2644. 
5 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629. 
6 See generally William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 87, 136-43, 160-61 (2001). 97  
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rather than having been used to decide what the coverage formula would be.7  
The Court’s refusal to consider post-hoc rationalizations is akin to adopting 
for Congress a foundational administrative review doctrine known as the 
Chenery principle.8  As this essay will explain, however, this requirement 
sets Congress up to fail.  Congress lacks the institutional design or 
competency to create the kind of record the Court now demands, and that 
demand ignores the reality of the legislative process.    
 
Distinguishing Legislative From Administrative Records 
 
The judiciary is well versed in reviewing records.  In the most familiar 
scenario, courts engage in appellate style review of adjudicatory records.  
Primarily, appellate courts review records created by trial courts.  Those 
records consist of a memorialization of all evidence and argumentation 
received by the court, and thus is the whole universe of material considered 
in reaching a decision.  Similarly, when administrative agencies engage in 
adjudications, the agency produces a record of the proceedings.9  That record 
is subject to review by the judiciary.  
 
Processes that end in lawmaking, however, do not inherently produce a 
“record” of the same variety.  Nonetheless, courts must still review laws, 
whether they are enacted by Congress or administratively adopted in the 
form of regulations. In the administrative law context, judicial review of 
regulations has included a review of the record relied on by the agency, and 
agency practice accommodates the need for record creation.  Notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the most prevalent form of regulation, results in a 
record of public comments, agency proposals, and a typically in-depth 
explanatory justification of the final rule. 10   While the “record” in a 
rulemaking process may not be as easily defined as an adjudicatory record, 
judicial review of that record to determine if the final rule is adequately 
justified is entirely possible.  Moreover, under the Chenery principle, the 
agency may only defend the final rule on the grounds that it offered 
7 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2628.  
8 The Chenery principle comes from SEC v. Chenery Corporation, which held that agency actions 
challenged in court must stand or fall on the justifications offered by the agency at the time the 
decision was made, rather than any post-hoc rationalizations. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 
87 (1943). 
9 The type of record produced may depend on the nature of the proceedings, but the requirement 
that the courts review the administrative record has been applied to formal and informal 
proceedings alike.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (detailing that courts must “review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 419 (1971) (applying the record review requirement to informal proceedings).  
10 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring a “concise general statement of [the] basis and purpose” to 
accompany each final rule); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 596 
(5th ed. 2010) (explaining that “[t]he courts have replaced the statutory adjectives, ‘concise’ and 
‘general’ with the judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and ‘encyclopedic’”). 98  
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contemporaneously with its decision, rather than relying on extra-record 
reasons.11 
 
Reviewing a record for adequacy in the administrative law context, 
including limiting the review to the confines of the record, is justified on 
several grounds. Administrative agencies are designed to exercise technical, 
scientific, and policy expertise and to investigate problems fully before 
reaching a final policy decision.  A record requirement ensures that the 
agency’s investigation is memorialized and that the agency is basing its 
decision on the exercise of its expertise.12  Moreover, in the administrative 
law context, the ultimate decision-maker (e.g., an agency director) can collect 
the materials that constitute the record.  Record review is thus not only 
possible, but also furthers the judiciary’s proper role of overseeing agency 
actions to ensure they reflect a proper exercise of the power delegated to 
them by Congress.   
 
The idea of a record in the context of federal legislation has been 
properly questioned as an incoherent or even impossible concept. 13 
Lawmakers do not memorialize all of the facts or factors that are weighed in 
their decisions. Legislators meet with lobbyists, policy groups, and 
constituents for input, as well as having their own staffers conduct research 
and make recommendations.  This legislative process inherently occurs in 
large part off the record.14  The actual materials influencing 535 individual 
decision-makers (or some subset of them who affirmatively vote on any piece 
of legislation) are not only unknown, but likely unknowable.  A record similar 
to the record created in a trial simply is not available. 
 
Moreover, imposing a record requirement risks “transform[ing] 
Congress into a type of administrative agency subject to the control of the 
superintending judiciary.”15  Congress simply wouldn’t be able to engage in 
the type of compromise or political maneuvering inherent in the legislative 
process if it were subject to a the same kind of record requirement as are 
agencies.  While committee reports, floor statements, and hearing transcripts 
may appear to create a sort of legislative record, they do not represent the 
sort of comprehensive supporting material relied upon to come to a final 
11 Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87. 
12 A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's 
New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 371-72 (2001). 
13 Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 6, at 91. 
14 Bryant & Simeone, supra note 12, at 385-86. 
15 Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative 
Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 739 (1996).  Krent further argues that, like stringent 
record review in the administrative context, requiring legislative records imposes costs on the 
legislature and injects the judiciary into the policymaking process.     99  
                                                        
SETTING CONGRESS UP TO FAIL  
position that can be found in a record created by an agency engaged in 
rulemaking.  Moreover, federal statutes may reflect policy choices that are 
ideological and political, not policies grounded exclusively in an investigation 
of only objective facts.16  Accordingly, a court should not treat a legislative 
record as reviewable in the same way as other record review. 
 
          
Shelby County’s Impossible Mandate 
 
In many contexts, courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, must 
review legislation for constitutionality.  In the rights protection context, this 
typically rests on a review of the purpose of the legislation in relationship to 
its means of accomplishing that goal.  As others have observed, this inquiry 
necessarily involves consideration of facts that “transcend the dispute.”17 It is 
perhaps neither surprising nor inappropriate that congressional findings—
whether embodied in the legislation itself or in various reports, statements, 
and hearings—are considered by courts when ruling on these matters. 
 
While congressional findings have long had a role in the constitutional 
review of legislation, it is only relatively recently that the Court began a 
searching inquiry into the adequacy of this so-called legislative record.18  In 
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, for instance, the Supreme Court struck down a 
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the ground that the 
congressional record did not contain adequate findings of past discrimination 
in state employment. 19   Importantly, the Court also refused to consider 
relevant evidence of the type it required if that evidence was not in the 
congressional record. 20   Thus, the review was suddenly limited to the 
congressional record itself.   
 
Shelby County involved exactly this type of review, in which the Court 
had to determine if the preclearance measures reauthorized in the VRA were 
sufficiently tailored to the current problems of voter discrimination. As it has 
in other recent cases, the justices—both in the majority and in the dissent—
were keenly focused on the details of the record.  Parts of the majority 
opinion read like an opinion reviewing an agency action: the Court nitpicks 
Congress’s statistics on voter registration21 and combs through the evidence 
to conclude that the incidents reported in the covered jurisdictions are 
16 Bryant & Simeone, supra note 12, at 384 (suggesting various other reasons Congress may hold 
hearings). 
17 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-finding”: Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552-53 (1991). 
18 Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 6 at 99; Bryant & Simeone, supra note 12 at 332. 
19 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001).  
20 Id. at 370-71 (refusing to consider evidence not submitted directly to Congress).   
21 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2626, 2627-28.   100  
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insufficiently pervasive and not meaningfully different from those reported in 
the non-covered jurisdictions.22 The dissent, likewise, exhaustively details the 
evidence Congress documented and draws the conclusion that the VRA’s 
reauthorization was amply justified.23  This type of analysis appears more 
like administrative “hard look” review where courts review agency rules to 
ensure the agency has not “relied on factors which Congress has not intended 
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”24  Yet, this type of 
review is inappropriate for decisions made by a body of elected 
representatives who, by their nature, are not simply exercising objective 
expertise, are not expected to act as neutral decision makers, and are not 
acting within the confines of an evidentiary record.   
 
Courts should not constrain their review to look only at the 
congressional record for predicate facts justifying particular legislation, nor 
should Congress be required to produce a comprehensive record it lacks the 
institutional capacity to create.  Despite these institutional barriers, 
Congress believed it had learned its lesson from recent cases regarding the 
need for a robust record: the legislative record it created for the 
reauthorization of the VRA was more than 15,000 pages long.25    
 
Still, as it has before, the Court ended up requiring even more of 
Congress than those legislators could have predicted. 26   However 
inappropriate legislative record review is generally, the Shelby County Court 
went a dangerous and unprecedented step further.  Amazingly, the majority 
opinion refused even to consider the record Congress had created.  As the 
majority acknowledged, Congress “compiled thousands of pages of evidence 
before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act.” 27   Nonetheless, after giving 
virtually no consideration to the actual evidence, the Court recites what it 
calls the “fundamental problem [that] Congress did not use the record it 
compiled to shape a coverage formula.”28  Indeed, the government itself had 
22 Id. at 2629. 
23 Id. (Ginsburg J., dissenting) at 2640-41. 
24 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).   
25 Shelby Cnty., (Ginsburg J., dissenting), 133 S.Ct. at 2636. 
26 This is not the first time the Court has imposed record creation obligations that Congress could 
not have anticipated.  See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
80, 85 (2001) (“Under the crystal ball approach, the Court effectively penalizes the enacting 
Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative record, even though such a record requirement 
could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation and 
enactment”). 
27 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629.  
28 Id. 101  
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candidly argued that the formula was “reverse-engineered” in that Congress 
came up with the coverage formula first and then later sought to justify it.29  
By ignoring the record entirely as having been irrelevantly compiled after a 
coverage formula had been effectively chosen, though not yet enacted, the 
Court essentially imposes a Chenery principle on review of Congress by 
refusing to consider any justifications made after the fact.   
 
While it sounds facially reasonable not to accept post hoc justifications, 
the requirement is absurd when applied to Congress.  It is clear why 
Congress created a record to justify a decision it had already made.  Members 
of Congress had met with constituents, interest groups, lobbyists, experts, 
and each other informally and formally about reauthorizing the VRA 
probably thousands of times by the time the matter was formally under 
consideration.  Votes had been counted, political deals had been made, and 
everyone knew the VRA would be reauthorized.  The decision-making had 
been done.  Now all that remained was to create a record, as Congress knew 
it must for the purpose of surviving a constitutional challenge.   
 
The Court’s idea that Congress should first create a record of evidence 
to study and only then decide how it wants to act is predicated on a fallacy.  
The Court’s record review regime fails to account not only for the reality of 
Congress’s role as a political body, but also the design of the legislative 
process.  In effect, the Court is asking of Congress something it will never be 
able to deliver.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Shelby County represents the judicial activism Justice Ginsburg so 
rightly identified.  The majority opinion, however, lays the blame at the feet 
of Congress for having failed to create an adequate record to support its 
decision and implies that Congress could revisit the matter and correct its 
mistakes. Not only does Shelby County represent the latest and one of the 
worst examples of inappropriate legislative record review, it inexplicably 
adds an additional administrative law constraint into the mix by disallowing 
record evidence gathered after a decision has been effectively reached.  As a 
result of the Court’s trend toward reviewing Congress like it would an 
administrative agency, Congress, designed not as a neutral expert but as a 
political decision maker, is not likely to meet the standard the Court has set 
out for it.  In effect, the Court is setting Congress up to fail.30    
 
29 Id. at 2628. 
30 Other instances have been identified where the Court has set a stringent record requirement 
that is likely unattainable, thus setting Congress up to fail.  See e.g., Colker & Brudney, supra 
note 26, at 86 (noting that the type of evidence the Court said was required in Board of Trustees v. 
Garrett “for practical reasons may be unattainable”). 102  
                                                        
